DAMAGES GIVEN IN EQUITY IN LIEU OF A
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
In the June number I discussed the subject of partial specific performance.'.- In cases-of partial specific performance,
the defendant, not being able to substantially perform his
contract, is obliged by the court to perform as far as he is
able. It may be, however, that the defendant is unable to
perform his promises even in part. In such a case the only
possible obligation the law can fasten on the defaulting
party is the payment of money, or the conveyance of other
property, as damages for the default. The court of equity
is not ordinarily a court in which money damages for breach
of contract can be recovered; yet, under certain circumstances, where the defendant cannot perform his contract,
equity will retain the bill for the purpose of giving the plaintiff damages. As in such cases the defendant has no right
to any relief against the plaintiff, and as the foundation of
the plaintiff's rights is a contract, we may regard the action
of the court as another exception to the rule that the remedy
of specific performance must be mutual, though, of course,
strictly speaking, the plaintiff does not obtain what is usually
called specific performance. He does, however, obtain relief
in equity.
The leading case in which we find a court of equity retaining a bill for a specific performance in order to assess damages is Denton v. Stewart, 2 a case decided by Lord Kenyon
in 1786. There, A. and B. agreed by parole that A. should
buy a certain house from B. A. went into possession, but
B. brought an action of ejectment. against him and turned
him out. The parole agreement could not have been set up
'At page 329. Other papers on the specific performance of contracts
and the

defence of want of mutuality will be found: Am. LAW.. RM,
p. 319; July, 1901, p. 383; August, '9o, p. 447; September,

June, 190,

Igoi, p. 5o7; October, Igo, p. 559; February, i9o2, p. 65; May, i9o2,
p. 251.
21 Cox. Eq. 258, i786, s. c. i7 Ves. 276, note.
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at law as a defence to, the action of ejectment. 3 After the
ejectment, B. sold the house to a stranger for value and
apparently without notice of A.'s right. Probably after this
sale, but certainly without knowledge of it, A. brought his
bill against B. for a. specific performance, setting forth previous possession as sufficient part performance to take the
parole contract out of the statute of frauds. 4 Lord Kenyon
thought there had been sufficient part performance to
entitle the plaintiff to specific performance, had the land not
been sold. He ordered that it should be referred to a Master
to inquire what damage the plaintiff had sustained by the
defendant's non-performance, and that this damage, together
with the costs of the suit, should be paid by the defendant.5
Lord Kenyon might have cited in support of his action
a case then almost a hundred years old, namely, Hedges v.
Everard.6 There a man, before his marriage, settled on himself and his intended wife certain lands, and covenanted that
they were and would remain of a certain value. On the
death of the husband, the wife brought her bill to have the
defect in the lands ascertained and made good out of her late
husband's real or personal estate. It was objected that the
bill sounded only in damages, yet'the court held that a Master could inquire into the defect and report, when the court
"may decree such defect to be made good, or send to be
tried at law upon a Quantum damnificatus." Though this
'This at least was the opinion of the judges of the King's Bench at
the time: see i Cox. Eq., p. 258.
'In the note by Sir Samuel Romilly, i7 Ves. 276, it is stated that the
fact of the assignment to a third person did not appear in the answer,
but was first ascertained from the defendant's counsel. Lord Eldon
seems to assert that the sale was made after the bill was filed, as in
Todd v. Gee, 17 Ves. 273, i8io, 278, he makes the assertion that in
Denton v. Stewart the defendant had put it out of his power to perform
the agreement pending the suit. It may be, however, that Lord Eldon's
opinion, that otherwise the case is bad law, influenced his opinion of the

facts.
"Page 258. That the case is not better reported is -probably due to
the fact that it was not much contested, as the damage to the plaintiff

seems to have been only nominal. See remarks of Lord Eldon in Todd
v. Gee, i7 Ves., p. 277.
6i Eq. Cas. Abr. 18, pl. 7, 1699.
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case is an authority tending to support Lord Kenyon's
action in Denton v. Stewart, it can hardly be said to deprive
the later case of its position as the earliest case in which
damages were given by a court of equity where a specific
performance was impossible. It is a long step from giving
final relief to a jointress who had married on the faith of the
provision, to an award of damages to an ordinary purchaser
who seeks specific performance but cannot have it owing to
a conveyance by a vendor to a third person.
In Greenaway v. Adams,7 Sir William Grant, though he
frankly says he does not understand the principle on which
Lord Kenyon proceeded, unwittingly extends the principle
of that case. In the case before him the plaintiff had agreed
to take from the defendant the assignment of the residue of
a lease. The defendant had offered to convey, but the plaintiff had refused to accept on the ground that the lease contained a clause forfeiting the same in case of an assignment
without the consent of the lessor, and there was no evidence'
'that the lessor had consented. The defendant, contending
that the consent of the landlord was not necessary, assigned
the lease to a third person. There would appear to be no
question but that the plaintiff, at the time he brought his bill,
knew of this assignment. In Denton v. Stewart no such
knowledge on the part of the plaintiff appears. Yet Sir
William Grant says: "The case of Denton v. Stewart is a
decision in point, . . . the species factilis precisely the same
as in this case.
For in that the inability of the party
to perform the contract grew out of an act done by the party,
after the contract had- been entered into." s He also points
out that there is no difference in principle whether the damages are assessed by an issue quantum damnilicatus or by
a Master, as the real question is whether the court of equity
can give relief in damages at all. Frecisely the same order,
was made as in Denton v. Stewart.9 In Todd v. Gee40 there
.

12 Ves. 395, i8o6.
'Pp. 401, 402.
'The next year in Gwillin v. Stone, 14 Ves. 128, i8o7, Sir William
Grant refused to give damages in addition to cancellation where the
plaintiff sought cancellation of a contract to purchase the defendant's
land, on account of the vefidor's defective title, and also damages for the
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was an agreement to purchase land. There was considerable doubt in regard to the power of the vendors, who were
executors, to sell. The vendee prayed for a specific performance, if a good title could be made, or damages. The
defendants demurred to the relief. Lord Eldon, regarding
the plaintiff as having a right to have the possibility of the
defendant making a good title ascertained, overruled the
demurrer. In the course of his opinion, however, he says
that, in a case circumstanced as the one before him, if the
defendant could not make a good title, the plaintiff could
not have the bill retained to assess damages, and points out
that, "In Denton v. Stewart the defendant had it in his power
to perform the agreement; and put it out of his power pending the suit,"' 1 asserting that it is only on this ground that
Lord Kenyon's decision can be supported. Though, as we
see, Lord Eldon did not in Todd v. Gee formally overrule
Denton v. Stewart, and did not even express the opinion that
he would not follow Lord Kenyon in a similar case, it is
probable that, at the time, Todd v. Gee was regarded as
practically doing away with the possibility of recovering
damages in equity where specific relief could not be given.1a
Thus in Sainsbury v. Jones,'3 a case decided in 1839, Lord.
Cottenham says: "I certainly recollect the time at which therewas a floating idea in the profession that this court mightaward- compensation for the injury sustained by the honperformance of a contract, in the event of the primary relieE
fof a specific performance failing.
lasted but a short time, for, . . .

.

.
. This, however,
Lord Eldon, in Todd

v. Gee, expressly overruled Denton v. Stewart; and from
that time there has not, I believe, been any doubt upon the
breach. He refers to his hesitancy in Greenaway v. Adams, but
properly points out that the bill before him is of a different nature.
The case does not indicate that he was inclined to believe that his
action in Greenaway v. Adams was incorrect.
10I7 Ves. 273, r8io.

-

SPage278.

'In Blore v. Sutton, 3 Mer. 235, i818, 247, Sir William Grant said:
"The competency of the court of equity to give damages for the nonperformance of an agreement has, notwithstanding the case of Denton
v. Stewart, been questioned by very high authority." The question was
not directly before him.
15
My. & Cr. I, 1839.
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subject."' 14 In view of this final position of the English
courts, had it not been for their effect on the American cases,
Denton v. Stewart and Greenaway v. Adams would have for
us merely historical interest.
In England the Parliament has by statute revised and
very much expanded the principle that a court of equity may
give the plaintiff damages, where an award of specific relief
is impossible. The first step in this direction was Lord
Cairn's Act, passed in 1858. This provided, that, "In all
cases in which the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to
entertain an application

.

.

.

for specific performance

of any covenant, contract, or agreement, it shall be lawful
for the same court, if it shall think fit, to award damages to
the party injured, either in addition to or in substitution for
such

.

.

.

specific performance, and such damages may

be assessed in such manner as the court shall direct."'15 As
construed by the courts this Act did not permit the Court of
Chancery to give damages in a case where the plaintiff asked
-for a specific performaice of a contract not the subject of
such relief as a contract for personal services. 16 It was also
" Page 3. In the case before Lord Cottenham, C. contracted as agent
of B. and D. to sell land to A. B. and D. denied the agency. A.
brought his bill against B., C. and D. for specific performance, or if
that was impossible, that the bill should be retained against C. and
damages awarded. The bill was dismissed. The ease is distinguishable from Denton v. Stewart. The defendant had not put it out of his
power to fulfil the contract, and the plaintiff, when he brought his
bill, knew of the defendant's inability to perform. This knowledge is
not adverted to in any of the early English cases as proving a barrier
to the recovery of damages. Later, however, it was held by Lord
Romilly as sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's right to compensation for
defects in title, if these defects were known to the plaintiff at the time
he brought his bill: Maw v. Topham, 1g Beav. 576, 1854. It is not
unlikely that Lord Romilly's decision would be followed in most of the
United States, where the defendant in addition showed that he was
willing to. convey as far as he could before bill brought: Compare
Rankin v. Hammond, 25 Pa. C. C. 45 (igoo) with the decisions in the
text, infra on the effect of the plaintiff's knowledge, at the time he
brought his bill, of the impossibility of the defendant's performance.
i 21 and 22 Vict., c. 27, § 2.
"Rogers v. Challis, 27 Beav. 175, 1859, ISo; White v. Boby. 26 W. R.
133, 1877. (A case decided after the Judicature Act, but which discusses, page 134, the effect of Lord Cairn's Act: Compare note 21,
infra.)
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intimated by Lord Romilly, following his thought expressed
in Maw v. Topham,' 7 that the plaintiff, at the time he brings
his bill, ought not to know of the inability of the defendant
to perform his agreement. 8 These interpretations of Lord
Cairn's Act have not now in England any importance, because the Act itself, though it may not be formally abolished, 19 is practically superseded and extended by the Judicature Act. This later statute provides that, "The High
Court of Justice and Court of Appeal, respectively
in. every cause or matter pending before them
shall grant

..

.

.

all such remedies whatsoever as any

of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect
to any and every legal claim properly brought forward by
them respectively in such cause or matter; so that, as far as
possible, all matters so in controversy between the said parties, respectively, may be completely and finally determined,
and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning such
matters avoided. '20 Under this sweeping provision, it would
appear to be immaterial whether the plaintiff asked for specific performance or damages, whether he knew of tie facts
.rendering specific performance impossible at the time he
brought the bill or not, or even whether, irrespective of those
facts, it was a case for specific performance at all. Provided the plaintiff shows that he has a legal claim, the court
will end the controversy between the parties, by giving, the
plaintiff the relief to which, under all the'circumstances of
2
the case, he is entitled. '
19 Beav. 576, 1854, see supra, note 14.
' Howe v. Hunt,8 Jur. N. S., Pt. 1, 834, 1862. The opinion as a'whole

27

is confused and most unsatisfactory.
"9Lord Cairn's Act was formally repealed by 46 and 47 Vict., c. 49,
schedule, but § 5 of this act provides: "The repeal effected by this
act shall not affect (b)

any, jurisdiction

.

. . established

.

under any enactment repealed by this act." In Sayers v. Collyer, L. R.
28 Ch. Div. IO3, 1884, Baggallay thought that this clause preserved the
second section of Lord Cairn's Act.
"36 and 37 Vict., c. 66, § 24 (7).
"See, for language similar to that used in the text, Sayers. v.
Collyer, L. R. 28 Ch. D. IO3, 1884; also Elmore v. Pirrie, 57 L. T.
n. S. 333, 1887. In White v. Boby, 26 W. R. 133, 1877, Lord Jessel
assumes that the Judicature Act does not enable one who asks for
specific performance of a contract of which the court of equity does
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In the United States the development of the law on the
subject under discussion has differed from that in England
in two vital particulars. On the one hand, Denton v. Stewart, with certain limitations, has been generally followed;
on the other, statutes embodying the principle of this decision have only been adopted in some of the States, and,
where adopted, have not always received a liberal interpretation. Perhaps the earliest'American case is M'Connell v.
Dunlap.2= There, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
declared that, if in a bill for a specific performance of a contract to convey land, the defefidant could not make title to
more than one-half the acreage, the trial court should direct
23
It
an issue to a jury to ascertain the value of the land.
will be noted that this was following without qualification
the principle of Denton v. Stewart. The same court, however, a few years later, in Fisher v. Kay,2 4 were the first to
intimate what we may regard as the chief qualification to
the doctrine of the English case. The plaintiff and the
defendants' ancestor agreed to exchange lands. The plaintiff had conveyed his land to the defendants; but they had
conveyed their land to a third person. This fact was known
to the plaintiff at the time he brought his bill for specific
performance, a return of his own land, or damages. The
court intimate that had the plaintiff not asked for a reconveyance of the land conveyed by him to the defendants, to
which equitable relief he was unquestionably entitled, there
might be some force in the objection that the plaintiff knew,
at the time he brought the bill, of the impossibility of securing the land to which- he was entitled under the contract.2 5
not have jurisdiction, as a contract for personal services, to have his
bill retained for the purpose of assessing damages. Query, however, if
the direct language of the act and the language of the later decisions
are not contra to Jessel's assumption?
'Hard. 41, Kty. 18o5.
'If the plaintiff would accept the half that could be conveyed, the
issue should be the value of the half not conveyed. "The plaintiff, however, was considered to have the right to insist on full compensatibn in
damages in a court of equity. The decision was followed by the same
court in Rankin v. Maxwell, 2 A. K. Marsh. 488, Kty. 182o.
42
Bibb. 434, Kty. 181.
'Page 426.
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A similar intimation, that the knowledge of the plaintiff at
the time of bringing the bill that he cannot have specific
performance would be fatal to its retention for the purpose
of assessing damages, was made by Chancellor Kent, in
Hatch v. Cobb,28 while in Kempshall v. Stone 7 he made
a positive decision to this effect. This decision has been
followed.28 In the cases cited the defendant, after the contract was entered into, disabled himself from fulfilling it.
Where, besides the knowledge of the defect by the plaintiff
at the time he brings the bill, the defect itself existed from
the time of the inception of the contract, there is, perhaps,
an additional reason for dismissing the bill. I have collected
in the note the cases presenting this combination of facts.2 9
It has also been held that if, at the time the plaintiff brings
his bill, he knows facts from which, had he known the law,
he might have inferred that the defendant could not perform
his promise the bill cannot be retained for damages. Thus,
where four out of five tenants in common united in a lease,
and the lessee agreed to sublet part of the premises, the
prayer of the sublessee for specific performance was denied,
'because the original lease was invalid, not being signed by
all the tenants in common, and the bill was not retained to
assess damages, because the plaintiff ought to have known
of this rule of law when he began his suit.30 Other cases,
however, have refused to go so far as this. Thus, in Slaugh4 Johns. Ch. 559, N. Y. x82o.
5 Johns. Ch. 193, N. Y. 1821, compare Slaughter v. Tindle, i Litt.
358, Kty. i82.
' Carrollv. Wilson, 22 Ark. 32, i86o, 52, 53, 54; Doan v. Mauzey, 33
Ill. 227, 1864; Senzble Suwmerlin v. Fronterizer Silver Mining Co., 41
Fed. 249, i8go; Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37, i87o (dicta). But see
Boden v. Curtis, 21 A. 472, N. J.i89i.
"Sellers v. Green, 172 Ill.
549, 1898, 558 (reversing on another point
64 Ill. App. 505, 1896); Mack v. McIntosh, 181 Ill,
633, i899; Bartol
v. Shaffer, 7 North. Co. R. 2o7, Pa. C. C. igoo. The principle is admitted
in McQueen v. Chouteau, 20 Mo. 222, 1855. A fortiori when at the time
of the contract the plaintiff knew that the fulfillment of the defendants'
promise depended on the will of a third person, the bill cannot be
retained to assess damages: Hill v. Fiske, 38 Me. 52o, 1854; Hulbut v.
Kautzler, 112 Ill. 482, 1884.
' Tainter v. Cole, i2o Mass. 162, 1876. See also Jones v. Tunis, 37
S. E. 841, Va. 1901.
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ter v. Tindle,3 ' the plaintiff in his bill set out that he had
doubts about the defendant's title, and asked that, if a
specific performance could not be awarded, a decree for
compensation in damages be made. The doubts proving
well founded, the bill was retained and compensation
awarded. It can hardly be maintained that this decision is
contrary to that of Chancellor Kent in Kempshall v. Stone.
Merely to doubt the defendant's ability to fulfill his agreement, is not to know that it is impossible for him to do so;
but the case is unquestionably contra to the Massachusetts
case of Tainter v. Cole, just referred to, provided in the
Kentucky case the plaintiff knew all the facts which rendered specific relief impossible, and merely had doubts about
32
the legal conclusion to be deduced from those facts.
It would appeal to the writer that knowledge of the fact that
a decree for specific performance cannot be had should be
fatal to the plaintiff's right to recover damages in the equity
suit. So long as a given jurisdiction recognizes the separation of law and equity, the mistake of the forum in which one
proceeds should be fatal to the action. If this were not so we
should have one forum administering common law as well as
equity. This may be desirable, but it is too fundamental a
change to be made by the courts. Such a change should be the
result of legislative action. It would also appear that this
mistake is none the less if facts are known to the plaintiff at
the time he brings his bill, from which, if he knew the law,
he would have known tlat equitable relief was impossible.
n i Litt.

358, Kty.

1822.

' See, for a case in whieh the defendant seems really to have known
that specific performance was impossible and yet the bill was retained

to assess damages, Gibbs v. Champion, 3 Ohio, 355, i828. In Huffman v. Bradshaw, 17 Pa. Sup. Ct. 205, Igoo, aff. 30 Pitts. Leg.
J. 387, igoo, the plaintiff brought his bill against a husband and
wife, asking for specific performance of an agreement to convey land.
He alleged that the refusal of the wife to join in the deed was at the
instigation of the husband. Proof of this failed. In Pennsylvania, one
who agrees to buy land from a married man can.refuse to take if the
wife will not join in the deed, but the court will not give him a decree
against the husband with compensation for the inchoate right of dower
in the wife. The plaintiff did not wish a deed signed by the man alone.
The court on this refusal gave money damages to the plaintiff. The
question of jurisdiction was not discussed.

IN LIEU OF A SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

403

Ignorance of the law on the part of a litigant ought not, of
itself, to be a foundation for a court's jurisdiction. On the
other hand, where one brings a bill for specific performance
who is ignorant of facts, or not sure of facts, which render
equitable relief impossible, he does not knowingly or negligently mistake his tribunal. It is not the plaintiff's business
to investigate all the facts and make sure that the aefendant
can be made to perform his contract, before he brings his
bill. The defendant is in default, and this default renders it
imp6ssible for the court to give the equitable relief asked.
There exisfs, therefore, a real if not necessarily -a good
reason for not asking the innocent plaintiff to withdraw his
present suit, and begin all over again in another forum.83
With the limitation just discussed, the principle of Denton v. Stewart meets, if not universal, very general favor.
Shortly after his decisions in Hatch v. Cobb and Kempshall
v. Stone, Chancellor Kent, in Woodcock v. Bennet,"'
decreed, that in view of the fact that the defendant had disabled himself from performing his contract, the plaintiff had
a right to have it referred to a Master to determine his damages. 85 Some years later in a like case, Assistant Vice-Chancellor Murray took a similar action.3 6 On appeal to the
Supreme Court the case was reversed, the court practically
reverting to the position of Lord Eldon, that chancery ought
only to retain the bill for the purpose of compensation in
'There

is one case in which the action of the plaintiff pending suit

made it impossible for the court to give equitable relief, and yet the
court retained the bill to assess damages. The case is that of Attorney
General v. Proprietors of Deerfield River Bridge, 105 Mass. i; 187o.
The defendant company was obliged by its charter to keep a certain
bridge in repair. The court by statute had, on information filed, a right
to -enforce the obligation. The Attorney General, on behalf of the
selectmen of the town in which the bridge was situated, brought an
information. During the pendency of the suit the town repaired the
bridge. The court retained the bill for the purpose of assessing
damages.
"I Cow, 711, 1823. In Hatch v. Cobb he had sympathized with Lord
Eldon's criticism of Denton v. Stewart.
' This action was approved by Woodworth, who wrote the opinion in
the Appellate Court, see I Cow. 755, 756. The decree of the Chancellor
was reversed on other grounds, see page 756.
' Wiswall v. McGowen, i Hoff. Ch. 125, N. Y. 1839, 130, 131, 132, 140.
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damages where, after bill brought, circumstances have rendered performance on the defendant's part impossible.3 7
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the Supreme Court's
decision was affirmed on other grounds, the court expressly
refusing to decide the point in the case to which I have
adverted. 38 Outside of this position of the Supreme Court
of New York in the single case referred to, I know of no
case in which a reference to .a Master or a quantum damnificatus has been refused in the United States, where, after
the agreement, and unknown to the plaintiff, the defendant
put it out of his power to perform his contract.3 9
While

Wiswall v. McGovern was in course of litigation

in New York, Chancellor Walworth, in Morss v. Elmendorf,40 said that if the plaintiff was ignorant, when he began
his suit, of the fact that the defendant could not be made to
perform, he was not prepared to say that the fact that the
defect had existed from the inception of the contract, and
had not been caused by the defendant, would prevent a reference to a Master to ascertain the plaintiff's damages. The
remark was aside from the facts of the case before him.
The point, however, was before the courts of New Jersey in
the case of Borden v. Curtis.41 There the bill was retained

for the purpose of giving the plaintiff compensation. Apart
from authority it would appear that, though the fact that
the defendant has not wilfully deprived himself of the ability
to perform removes him from the charge of wilful wrong,
the basis of the decision in Denton v. Stewart remains. In
proceeding in equity the plaintiff has done that which it was
proper for him to do, in view of the facts known to him;
there is no more reason why it is his duty to ascertain the
ability of the defendant to perform 1his contract in the case,
Barb. 27o, 1848, 281, 282.
"Reported as Price v. McGown, io N. Y. 465, 1853, 469.
W2

' The reported American cases in which the bill was retained are:
Andrews v. Brown, 3 Cush. 130, Mass. 1849, 135; Milkman v. Ordway,
io6 Mass. 232, 187o (a leading case'because of the care with which the
opinion is written) ; Chartierv. Marshall, 56 N. H. 478, 1876 (should
be read in connection with the same case in 51 N. H. 400, 1871).
ii
421

Paige 277, N. Y. Ch., 1844, 288.
A. 472, N. J. i891..
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where the disability has always existed, than in the case
where the defendant has wilfully created that disability.
In the New Jersey case just mentioned, the contract of
which the plaintiff sought performance was for the division
of land, and was by parole. The plaintiff argued that at
42
law, damages for non-performance could be recovered
though the plaintiff had shown part performance sufficient
in equity to take the case out of the statute of frauds, and
that this was an additional reason for obtaining damages
in equity. The court refers to this argument in the course
of its opinion, but does not discuss it;43 but, as it has the
weight of considerable judicial authority, I shall refer to it
at some length. As early as 1814 we have a case, decided
by Chancellor Kent, Phillips v. Thompson.44 There, A.
allowed certain commissioners to cut a canal through his
land. The damage done was to be assessed on neighboring
land. There was a parole contract between A. and the commissioners in reference to their entry on A.'s land. A. sought
specific performance. This Kent refused, on the ground of
the vagueness of the contract, and because of the statute of
frauds. He held, however, that the injury was done under
an implied contract that compensation should be made, and
issued a quantum damnilicatus to ascertain this compensation, on the express ground that the statute was a bar to any
recovery at law. It will be noticed that, irrespective of the
bar of the statute at law, in equity the damages when fotnd
would be a lien on other lands improved by the commissioners, and that this lien was not only an additional, but in itself
a sufficient ground for equitable jurisdiction. The Chancellor, however, does not refer to it. The key to the action
taken by Kent is found in Parkhurstv. Van Cortland.45 In
that case the plaintiff sought to enforce a parole option to purchase land on which he had made permanent improvements.
The Chancellor again refuses the prayer of the bill because
of the statute, and again refers it to a Master to ascertain
the value of the improvements. In taking this action, he not
See Keeler v. Tatnell, 3 Zab. 62, N. J. 185o.
"Page 145.
441 Johns. Ch. I31, I814.
4I Johns. Ch. 273, 1814.
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only relies on Phillipsv. Thompson, but refers to two earlier
46

English cases, Hollis v. Edwards and Deane v. Izard.
Quoting from the Lord Keeper, Kent makes him take the
position that the "plaintiff in each case, had a clear equity
to be restored to the money expended for improvements,"
(on the faith of a parole contract) ; that the bill would hold
so far, and that he would direct "an issue at law to ascertain
the damages." But a closer inspection of the cases shows
that this was not the position taken by the Lord Keeper. As
reported in Vernon he does assert that the "consideration"
paid for the improvements should be restored, and he adds
that, if damages are recoverable at law, "he should not doubt
to decree it in equity," though whether by "it" he means the
damage or the contract is not clear. To determine the question whether the contract can be sued on at law, he directs
that the plaintiff "should declare at law upon the agreement," and then "he would consider what was further to be
done in this case." In other words the cases stand for the
opposite to that for which Kent used them. They would
appear rather to uphold the extreme position that equity will
not take up the consideration of a parole contract until the
right to proceed at law is established. Indeed, from the
note to the cases in the edition of Vernon's reports published
in London in i8o6, it appears that the plaintiff, being nonsuited at law, the Lord Keeper dismissed the bill without
costs. It is probable that Chancellor Kent did not use this
edition, but the folio published in Dublin in 1726.
The principle established by Kent, though partly at least
an error in the interpretation of ancient authority, has been
adopted by other courts. Thus in Bowie v. Stonestreet4 7 a
husband induced his wife to sell her land for his benefit, on
the faith of a parole promise to convey other land of his to
her. The man died, having failed to fulfill his promise. The
woman could not at law have recovered against his estate;
yet, in equity she was held entitled to a decree for the value
of her land at the time she old it, and it would seem that
this decree was not to be satisfied out of any particular land
of the husband's, but was to be satisfied with the claims. of
Reported together, i Vern. 159, 1683.
"6 Md. 418, 1854.
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the other creditors out of his general assets. 4s, The case followed the announced principle of the two earlier cases before
Kent, but unlike those cases there was no other reason, such
as an equitable lien, for the jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery."
To the writer, the fact that damages at law cannot be
recovered because of the statute of frauds, is no reason why
a suit for damages on the same cause of action should be
brought in equity. The courts of equity may interpret the
statute differently from the courts of law, but the statute is
equally binding on both courts. Again, the view of the
statute taken by the common law courts may be erroneous,
but the court of equity has no jurisdiction to correct the
errors of a court of law. That so great a jurist as Kent
should have asserted that a court of equity would take jurisdiction of a suit for money damages because of the common
law court's interpretation of a statute is, I believe, due to
his erroneous impression that there existed English authority for the proposition. To the actual decisions of Chancellor
Kent, in Phillipsv. Thompson and Parkhurstv. Van Cortland, no exception can be taken. As has been pointed out,
even though the respective plaintiffs could have recovered
at law, they would only have recovered a judgment, while
in equity they could obtain that to which they were entitled,
if in view of the statute they were entitled to anything;
namely, a lien on the land improved for the value of the
improvements. This lien is the sole ground for the equitable
jurisdiction taken in King v. Thompson,5" a case in the
Supreme Court of the United States, in which the same
facts appear as in the cases before Kent. Granted that the
interpretation of the statute by the Court of Chancery is
different from that of the common law courts, where chancery takes hold of the question it is immaterial that had the
Page 433.
'The Maryland court followed this decision in Green v. Drummond,
31 Md. 71, 1869, 85. See -also the action taken by the courts of
Missouri in Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 40, 1870, 47, 48.
50 34 U. S: 204, 1835 (no reference
is made to the cases before Kent).
See also to the same effect dicta in Evans v. Battle, 19 Ala. 398, i8gi,
403, 404.
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plaintiff sued at law he would have been prevented from
recovering a judgment because of the statute; for the court
of equity is not bound to follow the interpretation given to
the statute by a court of law. 51 Whether the statute is or is
not a bar to a recovery for the value of improvements made
on the faith of an alleged parole contract by the owner of
the land to sell it to the improver is a question under the
52
statute, and one beyond the scope of our present inquiry.
It remains to consider the effect of the reformed code procedure, adopted in many of the States, on the plaintiff's right
to obtain damages, where it is impossible for the court to
decree specific performance. The only two code States in
which the writer can find that the question has been discussed are New York and Wisconsin. The provisions of
the practice codes in each of the States named, as far as they
affect our subject, are practically identical. In each the distinction between legal and equitable remedies is expressly
abolished. 53 There are similar provisions in relation to the
proper way to set forth the form of relief demanded. It is
directed that, "The complaint shall contain: A demand of
the relief to which the plaintiff supposes himself to be
'l

Aday v. Echols, 18 Ala. 353, 185o, 357; Hilton v. Duncan, i Cold-

well, 313 Tenn. i86o, 320.
2Horn v. Ludington, 32 Wis. 73, 1873, is a case in which the courts

appear to adopt the converse of Kent's position in the cases discussed in
the text, while at the same time following Kent to the extent of ignoring the possibility of an equitable lien. A. brought, under the reformed
procedure of Wisconsin,.a suit for a specific performance of a parole
contract in respect to real property. He failed because he did not
prove sufficient part performance to take the case out of the statute of
frauds. The plaintiff was not allowed to obtain a decree for compensation for money paid and labor done on the faith of the contract. The
assumption of the court is that such compensation would be legal, riot
ecluitable relief, and that the reformed procedure does not permit one to
obtain legal relief in an action commenced for equitable relief. There is
an apparent assumption that a suit at law for the money paid would be
successful, but, as indicated, the court ignores the fact that, if the plaintiff was entitled to anything, the Court of Chancery was the only court
which could give him full relief in the shape of a lien on the land for
the value of the improvements made.
"New York, Chas. Pocket Code Civ. Pro., 19o, § 3339; Code Civ.
Pro., 1849, § 691; Wisconsin, Laws 1856, Ch. 120, Preamble
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entitled."'5 ! - And again, "Where there is no answer, the
judgment shall not be more favorable to tle plaintiff, than
that demanded in the complaint. Where there is an answer,
the court may permit the plaintiff to take any judgment,
consistent with the case made by the complaint, and embraced within the issue." 55 The clause in relation to the
joinder of actions runs as follows: "The plaintiff may unite
in the same complaint, two or more causes of action, whether
they. are such as were formerly denominated legal or equitable, or both, where they are brought to recover as follows:
I. Upon contract, express or implied. . . . 9. Upon
claims arising out of the same transaction." 5 8 In both States
there are identical and liberal provisions in regard to a variance between the allegation and the proof, but this variation
must not amount to a failure of proof.57

The provisions

recited are typical of all of our practice codes, being found
in almost the same language in each. 58
"New York, Laws 1848, Ch. 379, § I8; Chas. Pocket Code Civ. Pro.,
i8gI, § 481; Wisconsin, Laws 1856, Ch. 120, § 47; Stats. 1898, § 2645.
New York, Laws 1848, Ch.379, § 231; Chas. Pocket Code Civ. Pro.,
1901, § 1207; Wisconsin, Laws i856, Ch. i2o, § i85, Stats. 1898, § 2886.
In the Wisconsin statute the words "but in any other case the court
may grant him any relief" are substituted for "Where there is an answer
the court may permit the plaintiff to take any judgment."
' New York, Chas. Pocket Code Civ. Pro., igoi, § 484. In Laws
i848, Ch. 379, § 143, the provision reads "The plaintiff may unite several
causes of action in the same complaint where they arise out of, i. Contract express, or implied." The clause in relation to "the same
transaction" does not appear. See also Laws x849, Ch. 438, § 1o7. In
Rev. Stats. i859, Vol. iii, Code Civ. Pro., § 167, the language in respect
to "legal or equitable" actions was adopted. In 1877 the language as
quoted in the text'was adopted, see Laws 1877, Vol. ii, Code Civ Pro.,
§ 484. Wisconsin Stats. i898, § 2647. This code uses the words "several causes of action," instead of the words "two or more," the words
"where they arise out of" instead of "where they are brought to
recover," and "the same transaction or transactions connected with the
same subject of action," instead of the ninth sub-head of the present
New York wording. In Wisconsin the language of this section as now
in force has existed from the adoption of the first code of practice, see
Laws i856, Ch. 120, § 73.

'New York, Laws i848, Ch. 379, §§ 145, 146, 147, Chas. Pocket
Code Cii. Pro., 19ol, 539, 540, 541; Wisconsin Stats. 1898, §§ 2669,
267o, 2671; Laws I856, Ch. 120, §§ 77, 78, 79.
' See Bryant's Code Pleading, Cal., 1899, pp. 352, 353.
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Perhaps the first case to mention the effect of these provisions on the right to recover damages in an action for a
specific performance was Hall v. Delaplaine, decided in
Wisconsin in I856.59 In the case in question, A. agreed to
buy land from B. B. conveyed to C. A. brought a bill for
specific performance, making B. and C. defendants, and alleging that C. took with notice. At the trial A. failed to proye
that C. took with notice. The bill was dismissed as to C.,
but ultimately retained against B. for the purpose of assessing damages. The court express the opinion that they would
have retained the bill anyhow, but that since the code procedure went into effect, and there is no separate court of
equity, there is an additional reason for retaining the bill.
New York, however, seems to have been first to apply the
code so as to permit a recovery of damages, where, had the
old practice prevailed, the plaintiff would have been sent to
0°
law. In Barlow v. Scott, the plaintiff asked for specific
performance or damages. On the face of the complaint the
plaintiff showed that he could only be given damages. The
defendant put in an answer. The court permitted the plainin a few
tiff to recover damages. This case was followed
61 where in a
years by the decision in Genet v. Howland,
case like Barlow v. Scott, except that the plaintiff did not
ask for damages, he was, nevertheless, permitted to recover
his bill being
damages, a specific performance on the face of
62 In Sternberger v. McGovern, 3 the complainimpossible.
ant set out a contract and asked for specific performance,
or other relief. At the trial it developed that the plaintiff
when he brought his .action knew that the defendant could
not perform his contract. The trial court on this ground
refused to retain the case for the purpose of assessing damages. On appeal this action was reversed and a new trial
ordered. The court point out that the code authorizes the
5 Wis. 2o6, 1856.
W24 N. Y. 40, i861, 45.

45 Barb. 560, i866, 568-573.
It is expressly recognized in both these cases that under the .old
practice damages could not have been recovered: 24 N. Y., p. 45, and
45 Barb., p. 568.
56 N. Y. 12, 1874, 20, 2.
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uniting of causes of action, both legal and equitable, arising
out of the same transaction in the complaint. They admit
that the facts constituting these causes of action must be
stated in the complaint," but assert that in the case before
them the plaintiff did this, by fully setting forth the contract.65 During the same period the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had come to similar conclusions.6 6
The cases just referred to are all examples of cases in
which the defendant answered. From them one may infer
that probably in all code States, once the plaintiff answers,
any relief consistent with the case alleged and proved can
be given, whether that relief is legal or equitable. In Horn
v. Ludington,6" however, the plaintiff asked for specific performance of a verbal contract in respect to land without
Pointing to Bradley v. Aldrich, 40 N. Y. 504, 1869, as a case in
which this was not done.
See dicta, Haffey v. Lynch, 143 N. Y. 241, 1894, 247, accord. (A
good rdsum6 of the matters under discussion in text.) In Miles v.
Dover Furnace iron Co., 125 N. Y. 294, i89i, the plaintiff brought his
bill for specific performance or, if that was impossible, damages. The
court in granting him damages say: "The plaintiff in his complaint
asked, as he had a right to, both damages for a breach of the entire
contract and a specific performance of a single branch of it, and himself raised the question which relief should be ,granted, and made
admissible all the facts of the situation bearing upon the alternative and
the exercise of the discretion invoked." P. 298.
'In Leonard v. Rogan, 2o Wis. 540, 1866, 542, one who asked for
equitable relief, b-t showed himself entitled to legal relief, was given
legal relief. In Hopkins v. Gi1nan, 22 Wis. 476, 1868, the plaintiff in his
complaint set forth an agreement by a lessor to take certain improvements made by the tenant at a valuation, valuers to be appointed by
both parties. On its face, this was not a contract of which a court of
equity gives a specific performance. The court retained the bill for the
purpose of assessing the value of the improvements as damages. Pp.
481, 482. Note that the value of the improvements was an equitable
lien on the land. The enforcement of this lien would be an equitable
relief, though not.that equitable relief which the plaintiff had demanded.
This phase of the case, however, is not referred to by the court. See
ante, note 50.

In Stroebe v. FelI, 2 Wis. 337, 1867, 348, the plaintiff demanded both
legal and equitable relief, setting forth facts which fvould have entitled
him to both; he only proved facts sufficient to give him legal relief. He
was held entitled to this relief.
GT32 Wis. 73, 1873, 79.
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setting out sufficient part performance to take it outside the
statute of frauds. The court assume that the complainant
did set out facts which would warrant the return in a
legal action of an equivalent for money expended. The
defendant demurred. Counsel and court agree that the
demurrer must be sustained if the plaintiff cannot, how
ground for equitable relief. This position is taken apparently on the ground of the-express provision in the code
requiring the relief on demurrer to be limited to that demanded by the plaintiff.68 There would appear to be no
reason why this case should not be followed in all jurisdictions having the provision of the code referred to.6 9 It has,
however, been held in New York that where the plaintiff
asks for specific performance or damages, whether he sets
out facts which entitle him to one or both, thie complaint setting out a clear cause of action; it is not demurrable.70 In
Wisconsin, however, it has been held, that where the plaintiff
asks for legal or equitable relief, the complaint on its face
showing him to be entitled to legal or equitable relief, but
not both, the complaint is demurrable.7 1 The New York
position would appear at first glance to be in accordance with
the general object of code procedure.72 On the other hand
Compare Tenney v. The State Bank, 2o Wis. 152, 1865,.163, 164.
"Note statement to the contrary by Pomeroy, see his Spec. Per.,
§ 481, ed. i897. An objection that there is an adequate remedy at law
can be raised in the answer. If a plaintiff asks for equitable relief, as
for a specific performance, showing on the face of the complaint that
he is only entitled to legal relief if any, the objection "of adequate
remedy at law" would appear to be final. See Witherbee v. Meyer, 84
Hun, 146, N. Y. 1895.

See Mowbray v. Funston, 9 N. Y. App. Div. i2o, 1896, where such
a demurrer was said to be "without merit." This case sets at rest the
doubt which may arise from reading Styles v. Blune, 3o N. Y. Sup. 409,
1894, whether such a complaint is not demurrable.
'Johns v. Northwestern Relief Asso., 87 Wis. 1I1, 1894, 113.
'All jurisdictions would probably follow Wisconsin in refusing to
permit a plaintiff, setting forth facts showing that he is entitled to
equitable relief, to prove a totally different course of action and obtain
legal relief. Here there would be a -variance which amounted to failure
of proof, a contingency for which as has been seen (note 53, supra) the
code provides: Carmichaelv. Argard, 52 Wis. 607, i888; Kavanagh v.
O'Niel, 53 Wis. 0I, i88i, io6.
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the Wisconsin position has behind it the positive provision
of the code that issues of fact, involving.a demand for a
sum of money; shall go to a jur at the request of either
party, while a question involving the relief of specific performance must be tried by reference. It follows that unless
the defendant knows which relief is to be demanded, he
does not know the kind of trial he has a right to insist on.
The reference to the subject of trial by jury brings us to
the one circumstance in which the new procedure may be
considered as narrowing the scope of what we may call
purely equitable proceedings leading to the recovery of
damages. Where, under the old practice, a court bf equity
gave damages, the judge, while he may have had the' right
to refer the question of the assessment of the amount of
damages to a jury, was not obliged to do so. A large number
of the practice codes, however, as just pointed out, contain
a provision, that issues of fact for the recovery of money
must go to a jury. 73 Under this clause it was held in Stevenson v. Buxton,7 4 that where the defendant, in his answer to a
bill to compel the conveyance of land, sets out that he never
had any title, the court may retain the bill, but, on demand
of the defendant, must send to a jury to assess damages. 75
The right to demand a jury trial may be waived by not
demanding it.7 6

The case of O'Beirne v. Bullis presents an

extreme example of this principle. In that case the plaintiff, not knowing that the defendant since the contract had
parted with the land, brought an action for a specific performance of the contract of sale. The lower, court refused
to retain the bill for the purpose of assessing damages. It
will be noticed, that even under the old practice this bill
"A full reference to these statutes will be found in a previous article.
See ante (February number) 49 AM. LAw REG., 19o2, 83, note 85.
"37 Barb. 13, N. Y., 186I.
' In this case, as the defect had existed from the inception of the
contract, it is of-course impossible to say positively whether the court
would or would not have assessed damages under the old practice,
See further as to the right of either party to demand a jury trial in
cases where under the old practice equity would 'not have retained for
the assessment of damages: Sternberger v. McGzern, 56 N. Y. 12,
1874, 21; Haffey v. Lynch, 143 N. Y. 241, 1894, 247.
" See, for example, Barlow v. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40, 1861.
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would have been retained, at least in most jurisdictions."
On appeal this action was reversed and the case remanded
for trial.78 When the case came again before the lower
court the defendant demanded a jury trial. This was
denied, and on appeal the denial was sustained, because the
defendant should have demanded a jury trial when the ques79
tion of the amount of damages first came before the court.
Whatever may be said as to this application of the rule
regarding waiver of the right to a jury trial, it will be
noticed on a reading of the case, that the court assumes that,
had the. defendant demanded a jury trial at the right time,
he would have been entitled t6 it. This is the nearest case
known to the writer on the question whether under code
procedurethe defendant has a right to a jury trial in a case
where under the old practice the court of equity would have
assessed damages in lieu of a specific performance. In view
of the apparent practical absence of authority, no positive
answer can be given to the question.80
In concluding the subject it is, perhaps, proper to mention
the fact that there are some cases in the code States, in which
the court has applied the rules of the old equity practice in
awarding damages where a specific performance is impos-.
sible. In most of these cases, as will be seen in the note,
no reference is made to the effect of the Practice Code in
widening the power of the court in respect to its ability to
award damages.81
William Draper Lewis.
Query as to New York, see ante, note 38.
8o Hun, 570, N. Y. 1894.
"2 App. Div. 545, N. Y. 1896. Compare Witherbee v. Meyer, 84
Hun, 146, N. Y. 1895.
'0See, for a reference to some conflict in respect to the meaning of the
provision in regard to jury trials, the article ante (February number)
49 AM. LAw REo., 84, note 86.
" O'Meara v. North American Mining Co., 2 Nev. ira, i866, 1i7;
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 59 Mo. 232, 1875. "(Dicta.

The case re-

ferred to by the court, Holland v. Anderson, 38 Mo. 55, 1866, has to do
with an award of damages where, owing to the alte-ation in the subjectmatter of the sale, its cancellation, otherwise proper, is impossible.)
Cunningham v. Duncan, 4 Wash. 5o6, 1892 (reversing the dicta in

Morgan v. Bell, 3 Wash. 554, 1892, in which the position of the Supreme
Court of Maine, in Woodinan v. Freeman, 25 Me. 531, 1846, that, to
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award damages in lieu of specific performance, the circumstances must
have been such at the time'of the filing of the bill as to have enabled the
court to grant specific performance). No reference is made in any of
these cases to the code. It may be noted that in Washington the
clause in reference to the joinder of actions omits the statement,
"whether formerly denominated legal or equitable," as well as the clause
in reference to "arising out of the same transaction." See Hill's Anno.
Code and Stats., I8.I; Code of Civ. Pro., Ch. VII, § 214; Ballinger's
Anno. Codes and Stats., Wash., 1897, § 4942.. The other clauses bearing
on the subject under discussion are similar to the New York Code, see
Hill (ib.), §§ 188, 219.
Thresher v. Stonington Savings Bank, 68 Conn. 2oi, 1896, 2o4,
2o5, is another instance of an award of damages in a' case.where the
award would hive been proper under the old practice. Reference is
here, however, made to the new procedure as an additional reason for
the relief.

